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Civil authority in all states has long been intimately connected to preparations
for war: gathering recruits and collecting taxes to pay for them have always been
central functions of the state.1 Long before the Bolsheviks, the Russian empire
had been forced by the changing nature of industrial warfare to adapt to the
needs of mobilization. From the late 1860s, even before German victory in the
1870–71 Franco-Prussian War had demonstrated the importance of carefully
coordinated mobilization, the Russian War Ministry’s Main Staff had been
preoccupied with assembling an army over Russia’s entirely inadequate railroad
net.2 This 50-year lead time meant that the Soviet state inherited a relatively
effective infrastructure for mobilizing men in the event of war. This human mo-
bilization was, however, only a part of what modern war would involve. The
Russian empire, like most Western states, neglected the economic and adminis-
trative demands of war, focusing instead on preparing its human material. Before
World War I, militarization was not a matter of preparing institutions, but of
preparing full-fledged citizens to make them better soldiers: fit, trained, intelli-
gent, and patriotic.3
As a result, when the Soviet state expanded military industry and prepared
for war in the 1920s and 1930s, it faced qualitatively different tasks in preparing
the various sectors of its civil administration. Certain people’s commissariats were
able to draw on a substantial imperial tradition. The People’s Commissariats for
Transport and for Post and Telegraph, given their long-recognized centrality to
manpower mobilization, were relatively well prepared for distributing
                                                        
1 Charles Tilly has argued that military imperatives essentially created the modern state. See Tilly,
“War and the Power of Warmakers in Western Europe and Elsewhere, 1600–1980,” in Global
Militarization, ed. Peter Wallensteen et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), esp. 77–78; and
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3 See William C. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,  1985), esp. 196–98, 203, 220–21, and Joshua Sanborn, Drafting the
Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925 (Dekalb, IL:
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mobilization notices, coordinating troop movements, and delivering soldiers to
the front. Matters were very different in other branches of the Soviet state. In
particular, people’s commissariats that had not traditionally been part of mobili-
zation in their pre-revolutionary incarnations before World War I were almost
entirely unprepared for the demands of total war after World War I.
Part of the story of Soviet civil mobilization and preparation for war is al-
ready clear. The opening of Russian archives has produced a flood of work on
Soviet military industry in the interwar period. While differing in emphases and
conclusions, this research has succeeded in outlining the growth of the Soviet
defense industry and its close connections with the Soviet state.4 In particular,
planning for war within Soviet industry is now quite well understood. Similarly,
Osoaviakhim, the mass organization dedicated to the ostensibly voluntary prepa-
ration of the Soviet population for military service, remains the object of serious
research.5 Many important questions remain, however, unanswered. This article
focuses neither on preparing citizens for war, as in the case of Osoaviakhim or
Russia’s imperial traditions, nor on preparing industrial mobilization. Instead, it
explores the ways in which more and more of the Soviet state, outside the narrow
sphere of heavy industry, became embroiled in increasingly elaborate mecha-
nisms to ready the Soviet Union for future conflicts. The Soviet Union’s growing
militarization did not merely involve funneling resources to military industry,
but the comprehensive involvement of all arms of the state in preparing for war.
This article will sketch how the imperatives of mobilization in the late 1920s and
early 1930s produced increasing links between the Red Army and Soviet civil
administration. In doing so, it will bring out three key themes: first, the steady
encroachment of military priorities into previously untouched spheres; second,
the consistent and yawning gap between directives from the center and imple-
mentation on the ground; third, as a partial explanation for this, the recurring
problem of a dearth of trained and competent administrators to carry out the
Soviet state’s ambitious projects.
                                                        
4 This burgeoning literature includes Nikolai Sergeevich Simonov, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks
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The Soviet vision of future war was far more total than imperial Russia’s had
been. One Soviet theorist, in fact, declared that Russia’s dismal preparation for
World War I made it an exemplary negative case.6 Strikingly, Soviet military
thinkers saw nothing good in tsarist Russia’s organization for war that they might
draw upon. Despite inheriting the old regime’s military bureaucracy largely in-
tact, Soviet theorists and administrators alike looked to foreign models or new
concepts, not to their own heritage, for answers to the problems raised by mod-
ern war. They saw Russia’s economic and social disasters in World War I as
leaving them little alternative. Even the victorious experience of the Civil War
was too improvised and chaotic to provide a useful model for a socialist state.
Soviet thinkers thus emphasized avoiding defeat by careful preparation for
the next war and the inherent advantages of a socialist, centrally-planned econ-
omy for that preparation. This included mobilizing not only troops and not
simply the military industry that would supply them, but the entire apparatus of
the state. Soviet military literature is replete with examples of this. Mikhail
Vasil′evich Frunze, head of the Red Army and influential Bolshevik military
thinker, declared that modern technology had done away with the distinction
between front and rear, and that societies must now organize themselves com-
pletely for war. Socialism would provide the Soviet Union with a vital edge in
doing this. Frunze’s understanding of the importance of peacetime preparation
of all of Soviet society for war was universally accepted. N. A. Danilov produced
a 16-point plan in 1926 for preparing the state for war, the first of which was
ensuring food and supplies not just to the army at the front but the civilian
population. This was only possible with “extensive work in peacetime.” Evgenii
Evgen′evich Sviatlovskii argued at the same time that mobilizing the Soviet econ-
omy necessarily included careful preparation of the labor force, transportation,
trade, and finance, all of which required systematic peacetime work. Boris Mi-
khailovich Shaposhnikov wrote in 1929 that even before World War I
“mobilization had become a phenomenon exerting deep influence on the general
life of the state, not restricted to the military alone. Now, with more complex
technology, with the immense exertions of opposing sides in war, the significance
of mobilization has grown still greater. In our day mobilization encompasses all
aspects of the life of the state.” No one denied the urgent need for compre-
hensive preparations.7
                                                        
6 N. A. Danilov, Ekonomika i podgotovka k voine (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1926), 194.
7 Mikhail Vasil′evich Frunze, “Front i tyl v voine budushchego,” in Izbrannye proizvedeniia
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940), 69–78; Danilov, Ekonomika, 190, 193; Evgenii Evgen′evich Sviat-
lovskii, Ekonomika voiny (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1926), 374–75, 378; Boris Mikhailovich
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The Red Army’s high command, along with the party and state leadership,
was therefore unsatisfied with existing institutions handling preparations for war.
The highest-ranking officers, fractious and squabbling over many issues, united
behind this cause. As the total nature of World War I had made clear, it was not
enough to put soldiers on trains to the front by including mobilization cells in
the Commissariats of Post and Telegraph or of Transportation. All levels of So-
viet government – central, regional, and local; economic and administrative –
would have to be fully cognizant of the needs of defense.
Convinced of the superiority of military methods and discipline, the Red
Army’s high command began concrete measures to draw civil institutions into
military planning in the early 1920s.8 In December 1924, a Staff report to the
Revolutionary-Military Council (the collective decision-making body of top offi-
cers running the Red Army) argued that the Staff could only carry out its respon-
sibility to prepare the country for war if it had the full cooperation of civil
people’s commissariats, many of which still lacked military cells. Even the “mo-
bilization organs” that already existed within some commissariats suffered from
poor leadership and no overarching coordination. The Red Army, the Staff ar-
gued, should provide guidance. It should therefore 1) coordinate the work of
commissariat “mobilization organs” and create new ones as necessary; 2) draw up
mobilization requirements and directives for each commissariat; 3) assist com-
missariats’ defense cells in determining their proper wartime role; and 4) incul-
cate a defense-minded spirit, possibly dispatching military officers to run these
defense cells.9
The Staff’s review of commissariats made for depressing reading. As ex-
plained above, Transport along with Post and Telegraph were in acceptable
shape, even by the Staff’s demanding standards. Vesenkha (the de facto Soviet
Ministry of Industry) was terribly prepared, however, for the demands of war, a
problem that would only be slowly ameliorated from 1925 to 1927.10 The Peo-
ple’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade’s mobilization cell was moribund. Gosplan,
the State Planning Commission, had a military cell, but a poor one that tried to
“encompass the unencompassable” and as a result performed poorly. The Com-
                                                        
8 On the military sense of superiority to civilian disorder, see von Hagen, Soldiers, 249–52.
9 Revolutionary-Military Council in Russian is Revoliutsionnyi voennyi sovet (hereafter Revvoen-
sovet). Report from Assistant to Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff to Chair of Revvoensovet,
December 1924, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (hereafter RGVA) f. 7, op. 11, d. 88, ll.
1-1ob.
10 Vesenkha is the Russian abbreviation for “Supreme Council of the National Economy” (Vysshii
sovet narodnogo khoziaistva). On improvements in Vesenkha, see Stone, Hammer and Rifle, chap. 1.
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missariats of Internal Trade, as well as Internal Affairs, Agriculture, and Enlight-
enment, lacked any mobilization infrastructure.11
In response to the Staff’s complaints and in hopes of promoting defense
preparation, the Red Army pushed successfully for some new body to guide and
oversee mobilization work. With the Soviet political leadership and the Red
Army equally preoccupied with foreign dangers, and seeing careful organization
as a cheap alternative to full rearmament, the Red Army got precisely what it
wanted. On 4 April 1925, Rykov’s Commission (the Soviet Union’s defense cab-
inet under the leadership of Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov) created a new “Mobi-
lization Commission” to coordinate mobilization efforts throughout the Soviet
state. The Council of Labor and Defense gave governmental approval soon
after.12
The initiative for the Mobilization Commission, as well as its structure and
its very name, came directly from the Red Army. In response to the Staff’s alarm,
the Red Army had produced several proposals in January and February 1925 to
improve haphazard and chaotic efforts at preparedness. The Red Army had
suggested a new organization to unify and direct mobilization work. It would be
part of the Red Army but have the rights of a standing commission of the
Council of Labor and Defense, giving its decisions binding legal force as gov-
ernment decrees. This Mobilization Commission was not intended to replace
Rykov’s Commission in making defense policy, differing from it in two key
ways. First, by contrast to Rykov’s Commission, the members of which were
either People’s Commissars or held equivalent rank, those in the Mobilization
Commission were one step lower: Deputy People’s Commissars from Finance,
Transport, or Trade, their equivalents at Vesenkha and Gosplan, joined by the
Red Army’s Chief of Staff and Supply Director. Second, in keeping with their
lower status, the members of the Mobilization Commission would not decide
policy but implement it, forcing civil institutions to take measures to ensure
proper wartime function. Determining policy was left to their superiors on
Rykov’s Commission.13
                                                        
11 Staff report, December 1924, RGVA f. 7, op. 11, d. 88, ll. 1–5.
12 See Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht to Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov, 7 May 1925, Gosudarstvennyi
arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) f. 5446, op. 55, d. 746, l. 4. The Russian name of
the “Interinstitutional Mobilization Commission was Mezhduvedomstvennaia mobilizatsionnaia ko-
missiia, though it was also referred to as the “Interinstitutional Mobilization Session” (Mezhdu-
vedomstvennoe mobilizatsionnoe zasedanie). On Rykov’s Commission, see Stone, Hammer and Rifle,
19–20.
13 Report of Deputy Chair of Revvoensovet, January 1925, RGVA f. 7, op. 11, d. 88, ll. 13–15;
Draft decision for Council of Labor and Defense (Sovet truda i oborony, hereafter STO) from
People’s Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat po voennym i mor-
skim delam, hereafter NKVM), early 1925: ibid., ll. 11–12.
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The first meeting of the Mobilization Commission took place on 29 April
1925 under Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev, former commander-in-chief of the Red
Army and now its Chief of Staff. He would soon be replaced as both Chief of
Staff and chair of the Mobilization Commission by Mikhail Nikolaevich
Tukhachevskii. Its only major difference from the Red Army’s original proposal
was that it lacked a Gosplan representative, since Gosplan’s chair Aleksandr
Dmitrievich Tsiurupa “protests against … the inclusion of a representative of
Gosplan in the Mobilization Commission.” In all other matters, the Red Army
had its way. The Mobilization Commission was military in its outlook and pro-
cedures: the Red Army’s Staff handled paperwork and the Red Army’s high
command served as the avenue of appeal should the group find itself deadlocked.
Much of its initial mission was educational, since those working on defense in
one commissariat had little idea what was going on in another. Thus the first
matters taken up were a report on mobilization procedures in France, Germany,
and the United States (a result of the broad consensus that foreign models were
superior to Russian tradition), and approval of the principle that each people’s
commissariat ought to form a special body with military assistance to handle
mobilization. Those already having defense sections, in particular Post and Tele-
graph, Transport, and Vesenkha, were merely to audit and review existing
procedures.14
Though the Mobilization Commission did succeed in some coordination of
defense policy, its two-year life showed that the distinction between policymak-
ing and implementation implicit in the dual existence of Rykov’s Commission
and the Mobilization Commission was difficult to navigate in practice. In early
1927, Rykov’s Commission was formalized, reorganized, and strengthened to
become the Executive Session (rasporiaditel′noe zasedanie) of the Council of La-
bor and Defense (RZ STO), the Soviet Union’s new defense cabinet. The Mobi-
lization Commission lost its reason for being and was quickly dissolved.15
During the Mobilization Commission’s short life, its chair Tukhachevskii
worked diligently to expand the network of mobilization organs. In July 1926 he
complained of the Soviet Union’s relative unpreparedness. War planning had
begun in 1925, he lamented, with the establishment of the Defense Commission
(i.e., Rykov’s Commission), but many people’s commissariats dealing with the
economy had not done enough to prepare for war. Its efforts to cajole other insti-
tutions into devoting more resources to defense were defeated by their more
                                                        
14 Protocol #1 of Mobilization Commission, 29 April 1925, GARF f. 5446, op. 55, d. 746, ll.
10–12; see also Unshlikht’s complaint to Rykov on Gosplan’s refusal to participate, 7 May 1925,
ibid., l. 4.
15 On the Executive Session (Rasporiaditel′noe zasedanie), see Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 48–49; RZ
STO meeting #5, pt. 9, 25 June 1927, RGVA f. 4, op. 17, d. 61, l. 38.
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pressing priorities, as there were always more tasks at hand than resources to
complete them. As the Red Army saw it, people’s commissars themselves had
pawned off defense to their deputies, refusing to make it their own responsibility.
In particular cases, glaring defects threatened defeat. The People’s Commissariat
of Agriculture, for example, had not properly accounted for the damage to the
agricultural economy imposed by the call-up of millions of Soviet peasants.16
Tukhachevskii’s concerns were repeated in a February 1927 report for Rykov
on mobilization readiness both in the Soviet Union’s constituent union republics
and in the central government. The picture was quite mixed. On the bright side,
the all-union commissariats by this time almost all had some mobilization cell
preparing for war.17 Some were quite good: Transportation, Post, and Tele-
graph, now joined by Vesenkha, had prepared extensively for mobilization. The
only all-union institutions without mobilization cells were the People’s Commis-
sariat of Foreign Affairs and the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate (Rabkrin), which
at least had a subordinate Military-Naval Inspectorate. The Russian Soviet Fed-
erated Socialist Republic, the Soviet Union’s largest union republic, was also
covered, for the republic-level commissariats under its control had their own
mobilization cells. Thus the center was fine, but the periphery proved problem-
atic. The union republics other than the Russian Republic almost all lacked pro-
visions for mobilization in the event of war.18
The new RZ STO defense cabinet attempted to improve matters in June
1927. In response to an investigative commission led by Red Army head Kliment
Efremovich Voroshilov, the RZ STO granted the lion’s share of responsibility for
war preparations to the Red Army’s Staff and to Gosplan, but also ordered the
creation of mobilization cells in civilian commissariats. Where an all-union
people’s commissariat already existed, defense preparation would be centralized
there. For matters having only republic-level commissariats, most notably Inter-
                                                        
16 Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii (Chair of Mobilization Commission) memorandum for 3
July 1926, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI) f.
76, op. 2, d. 182, ll. 157–63.
17 Simonov argues that the key moment in mobilization preparation among civil industry came at
the end of 1927 as a result of the spring 1927 war scare. This seems incorrect in two ways. First, by
February 1927 most institutions already had mobilization organs, some for several years. Second,
the crux of the issue is not so much when a particular mobilization organ began to function, but
when it began to function effectively, something that could be a matter of several years. See
Simonov, “The ‘War Scare’ of 1927 and the Birth of the Defence-Industrial Complex,” in Soviet
Defence-Industry Complex, 40–41.
18 1927 information digest on defense work over 1926, GARF f. 5446, op. 55, d. 1433, l. 11. On
the more-or-less satisfactory state of mobilization preparation in Vesenkha and the People’s Com-
missariats of Transportation and Post and Telegraph, see also Revvoensovet protocol #35, 19 July
1927, RGVA f. 4, op. 1, d. 562, ll. 13–15.
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nal Affairs and Agriculture, mobilization preparation would be run through the
relevant commissariat of the Russian Republic.19
Staffing these mobilization cells proved a constant problem. The RZ STO
allowed three weeks for the civilian commissariats to set up defense offices, not
nearly enough time to train civilians in the specialized knowledge mobilization
required. As a result, the RZ STO ordered that mobilization cells were to be led
“predominantly” by military officers seconded to civilian service, who would “re-
tain all rights and privileges” of military officers.20 In a recurring theme, this
mere order from the center was not enough, and the Red Army’s high command
felt it necessary to urge additional measures, requesting on 19 July further direc-
tives from the RZ STO to speed work.21
As this suggests, efforts at systematic preparation for war were crippled by
the eternal quandary of Soviet defense: an order from the center did not neces-
sarily produce local implementation. Simply demanding better preparation was
not enough, and Soviet defense policymakers would return again and again to
the problem of improving mobilization cells inside Soviet civil administration.
Rykov tried to do this in a circular on 21 December 1927. Lamenting that his
own central government had to date provided no systematic leadership to pre-
pare the union republics for war, Rykov demanded change. The union republics
were now obliged to replace any currently active committees or commissions
dealing with defense with “a special restricted meeting” (suzhennoe zasedanie) of
the republic’s governing Council of People’s Commissars. In addition to the
Council’s Chair and his deputies, this “restricted meeting” would include the
local military district commander, representatives of the OGPU secret police and
the Workers’-Peasants’ Inspectorate, as well as the chair of the republic Vesenkha
and Commissar of Agriculture. In any event, total membership was not to go
above six or seven, and the group would have its own secretariat to handle pa-
perwork. Rykov’s communiqué, while it told local authorities all they needed to
know, was not an official order. That came a week later in a governmental decree
from Rykov’s deputy Ian Ernestovich Rudzutak, directing the union republics to
form special bodies for defense preparation.22
These union republic groups were based on Rykov’s own RZ STO, includ-
ing their misleading title. The term that came to be applied to these bodies was
                                                        
19 RZ STO protocol #5, pt. 1, 25 June 1927, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (here-
after RGAE) f. 3429, op. 16, d. 6, ll. 127–28.
20 Ibid.
21 Excerpt from Revvoensovet protocol #35, 19 July 1927, RGVA f. 4, op. 1, d. 562, ll. 13–15.
22 Rykov as Chair of STO and Council of People’s Commissars (Sovet narodnykh komissarov, here-
after Sovnarkom) to Chairs of union republic Sovnarkoms, 21 December 1927, RGVA f. 7, op.
10, d. 632, ll. 1–2; Sovnarkom decree, 30 December 1927, ibid., l. 3.
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“restricted Sovnarkom” (suzhennyi Sovnarkom), giving no hint of their essentially
military responsibilities. This was reminiscent of calling the USSR’s defense
cabinet the “executive session” (rasporiaditel′noe zasedanie) of the Council of La-
bor and Defense. The nomenclature was not the only link between the RZ STO
and the “restricted Sovnarkoms.” Both were state bodies, made up of state, not
party, officials, and branches of local Council of People’s Commissars, not the
party hierarchy. Both were also organized on functional lines, linking representa-
tives of civil authority, the military, and the economy.
The experience of early 1928 showed mixed but generally favorable results
from these union republic defense cabinets. Rudzutak reported in September
that some had greatly expanded their responsibilities, going beyond preparations
for mobilization to readying the entire local economy for war. Others were
hardly functioning at all, meeting only to coordinate anti-aircraft defenses, and
all suffered from a lack of systematic planning and guidance from above.23
In an attempt to further improve their work, Konstantin Aleksandrovich
Mekhonoshin, Deputy Director of Gosplan’s Defense Sector, circulated guide-
lines in early 1929 aimed at improving their efficiency in relaying directives from
the center.24 This did not go far enough for the Red Army Staff, which de-
manded still further clarification of the responsibilities of the “restricted sessions”
and, more importantly, their full subordination to the center. Mekhonoshin was
not doing enough, in the Red Army’s view, to systematize and control defense
work at the local level, a criticism echoing earlier complaints from the RZ
STO.25
The most extensive efforts at local preparation came through Vesenkha.
Most of the Soviet Union’s major military plants fell under the all-union
Vesenkha; during wartime, however, expanded military production, especially of
ammunition, would force industry at all levels, including smaller factories under
the jurisdiction of local branches of Vesenkha, to produce war materiel. Accord-
ingly, on 7 May 1929 Vesenkha’s Standing Mobilization Conference, coordi-
nating preparations for war within Vesenkha, ordered the creation of local pleni-
potentiaries (upolnomochennye) of Vesenkha’s Presidium to oversee mobilization
work. This measure gave local authorities additional power, but did not set up a
                                                        
23 Ian Ernestovich Rudzutak report, 18 September 1928, RGVA f. 4, op. 1, d. 456, l. 461.
24 Konstantin Aleksandrovich Mekhonoshin circular, 16 January 1929, RGVA f. 7, op. 10, d.
632, l. 9.
25 Bokis reaction to Mekhonoshin proposal, 26 January 1929, ibid., ll. 6–7; Bokis short response
on same subject, 25 January 1929, ibid., l. 8. See also the RZ STO’s April 1928 request for
“maximum centralization” in union republic mobilization preparation, RGVA f. 4, op. 1, d. 473, l.
66. For an example of these groups in action, see meeting protocol on defense under Siberian dis-
trict executive committee, 4 January 1929, RGVA f. 7, op. 10, d. 632, l. 14.
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mechanism for independent inspection. In Ukraine, for example, the Chair of
Ukraine’s Vesenkha was made a plenipotentiary of Vesenkha’s central Presidium.
The same was true in Belarus′. In Leningrad, the job went to the chair of the
Leningrad region’s Council of the National Economy, with the same pattern for
Moscow, the North Caucasus district, the lower Volga district, and the Ural re-
gion. These new plenipotentiaries had extensive responsibilities, including over-
sight of investment, current production, labor plans, evacuation, anti-air defense,
quality control, and overall coordination of mobilization, all controlled by the
Mobilization Divisions (otdely) of the Union Republic Vesenkhas.26
It seems puzzling in retrospect that Vesenkha’s central authorities appointed
top regional administrators to audit their own defense preparations – hardly a
recipe for vigorous oversight. The answer lies in the jurisdiction granted these
local representatives. Both the original decision and later clarifying instructions
mandated that local plenipotentiaries enjoyed the power to inspect any enter-
prises within their geographic scope, whether an all-union plant answering to
Moscow, a republic-level factory responsible to the union republic’s Vesenkha, or
an enterprise of purely local significance. They were not limited to those plants
under their normal administrative purview, alleviating to at least some degree the
problem of conflict of interest.27
The move to organize civil people’s commissariats for war gained momen-
tum over the first half of 1929 with the approval of the First Five-Year Plan and
commensurate measures for defense. In January, the Red Army presented the RZ
STO a proposal for mobilizing civilian commissariats, a proposal that “should
become the basic leadership for both state and economic apparatus in preparing
the country for defense.” Mobilizing the civilian sector had no drawbacks from
the Red Army’s point of view: the effort and resources would come from other
commissariats, not the Red Army. What the high command needed was the
agreement of other institutions, and a mandate from the party-state’s highest
organs of power, to force reluctant civilian bureaucrats to accede to these plans.28
That mandate came in mid-1929. On 15 July, the Politburo issued two
wide-ranging decrees: “On Defense” and “On Military Industry.” A major over-
haul of Soviet defense policy, “On Defense” mandated further refinements and
closer linkage among the Soviet system of mobilization organs. At both the all-
union and union republic levels, in both civil and military institutions, mobiliza-
                                                        
26 Decision of Standing Mobilization Conference, 7 May 1929, RGAE f. 3429, op. 16, d. 14, ll.
26–27.
27 See Decision of Standing Mobilization Conference, 7 May 1929, ibid., and explanatory instruc-
tions, 26 July 1929, ibid., ll. 22–23.
28 Revvoensovet meeting #1, pt. 1, 2 January 1929, RGASPI f. 85, op. 1s, d. 90, l. 29.
MOBILIZATION AND THE RED ARMY ’S MOVE INTO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 353
tion cells were to be established by the spring of 1930.29 This was slow to begin,
but by the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930, the RZ STO spearheaded a
new drive to introduce war planning in non-military government bodies, or im-
prove those already-existing mobilization organs. The militarization of civil ad-
ministration continued to expand.
The People’s Commissariat of Agriculture, for example, had an importance
for defense not immediately apparent. The Red Army’s high command, particu-
larly in the wake of collectivization, was intensely concerned with the state of the
Soviet countryside. While some, notably Tukhachevskii, saw collectivization as a
welcome step towards converting petty-bourgeois property-holding peasants into
good proletarians, most officers seem to have feared the impact of rural discon-
tent on the morale of an overwhelmingly peasant army.30 Upon the outbreak of
war, the Red Army would become even more dependent on peasant conscripts,
and Soviet agriculture would have to feed the wartime population despite a sud-
den loss of manpower to conscription. Agriculture also had to prepare for the loss
of horses. The Red Army was in the 1920s and 1930s dependent on horse-drawn
transport, a problem only partially rectified during World War II. Just as with
soldiers and trucks, the Red Army made extensive preparations for requisitioning
horses from the Soviet countryside upon the outbreak of war. As a corollary to
this, Agriculture was also responsible for forming a veterinary corps capable of
keeping the Red Army’s horses healthy.
Accordingly, on 30 December 1929, the RZ STO ordered the People’s
Commissariat of Agriculture to develop a defense policy. The Red Army, fearing
Agriculture’s inability to assemble a coherent plan and hoping to put its own
stamp on any policy, helpfully forwarded a model statute.31 The Red Army’s
priority was ensuring a commitment to defense within Agriculture, reflected in
military insistence that the chief of the mobilization department not simultane-
ously hold other positions. The Red Army argued that both practically (in terms
of time devoted to defense matters) and symbolically (in order to demonstrate
that defense did indeed merit a full-time overseer), the position deserved undi-
vided attention. Shaposhnikov and Nikolai Nikolaevich Movchin complained
that splitting the job “cannot not produce a reduction in the pace and quality of
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work.” Voroshilov followed the lead of his staff, declaring that “as shown by sad
experience in other commissariats,” Agriculture’s military section must have a
sizable apparat and, more importantly, “be headed by a person freed from all
other responsibilities.”32
On 8 March 1930 the RZ STO ordered the creation of a full-fledged mobi-
lization section in the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture. After six weeks of
preparation, Agriculture organized its “Defense and Mobilization Sector” under
the general supervision of G. F. Grin′ko, Deputy People’s Commissar, and under
the direct leadership of V. V. Semashko.33 The defense sector, at least in theory,
would prepare collective farms for war (especially in border areas), supply suffi-
cient veterinarians for the Red Army’s horses, run military training in agricultural
schools, and service and support requisitioned tractors.34
Creating a defense sector on paper did not produce adequate preparedness.
Simple inability to find competent personnel crippled the new Defense and Mo-
bilization Sector for nearly a year. Grin ′ko requested qualified officers from the
Red Army, which quickly obliged.35 Even with military assistance, Narkomzem
could not manage its defense responsibilities. By September, it had only six of 16
statutory personnel, none of whom had experience in mobilization work; by No-
vember, there were only five.36
The true obstacle, of which insufficient staffing was only a symptom, was of-
ficial neglect. The People’s Commissar Iakov Arkad′evich Iakovlev and his depu-
ties, including Grin′ko, saw defense work as a waste of time. In a sign that non-
military administrators shared military laments over lack of commitment to de-
fense, Semashko complained to the Red Army’s Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich
that his Defense Sector suffered from “absence of direction on fundamental is-
sues,” and that he could not even speak with his superiors. As a result of the low
priority of defense, “business-like communication with the leading personnel of
the commissariat has not been established, despite long hours in waiting rooms
and insulting refusals to meet with me, with the exception of four or five literally
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minute-long meetings with Grin′ko.” He could not even obtain Moscow hous-
ing through Agriculture, so “from this date my family and I will be forced to live
on the street.”37
The Red Army found plenty of blame to apportion for the sad state of Agri-
culture’s defense sector. The Staff found that Agriculture’s collegium had not
discussed issues of mobilization even once during the course of its existence, and
readiness naturally suffered as a result. Despite Semashko’s attacks on his superi-
ors, however, the Red Army held him partly responsible, while still remaining
dissatisfied with Grinko and Agriculture’s leadership. S. I. Ventsov of the Red
Army Staff concluded that Semashko had shown himself incapable of handling
his job, and requested his dismissal. Semashko indeed lacked a defense back-
ground: he appears to have been an in-house appointment from Agriculture.
Ventsov suggested a replacement from the Defense Sector of the Russian Repub-
lic’s Gosplan.38 By the end of November 1930, the unhappy Semashko had been
replaced by Aizenberg as director of the defense sector. Aizenberg had no choice
but to appeal widely for help not to Agriculture itself but instead to the RZ
STO, the Staff, and the Defense Sector of Gosplan. Nearly a year had passed
with absolutely no result. Without substantial assistance and pressure from out-
side, Aizenberg would accomplish little more than Semashko had done.39
In the People’s Commissariat of Trade, efforts to organize for war dated back
to at least 1927. On 13 September 1927, Deputy People’s Commissar Lev
Mikhailovich Khinchuk held a meeting to discuss improving the already-existing
mobilization section. As soon as Movchin (temporarily head of Gosplan’s De-
fense Sector) heard of Khinchuk’s activities, he quickly stepped in to offer guid-
ance, particularly on the goals toward which Khinchuk should be working.
While applauding Khinchuk’s plans to coordinate his efforts with the Red Army,
Movchin’s priority, judging by his advice, was an uninterrupted supply of food.
He stressed maintaining stockpiles of bread and grain, in addition to other agri-
cultural raw materials and imported goods, along with preparing flour mills,
bakeries, grain elevators, and warehouses for mobilization.40
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Despite Movchin’s concern with food, by 1930 the People’s Commissariat
of Trade was moving towards eliminating its military sector, though this effort
was doomed to fail given the Politburo’s renewed commitment to defense. Trade
officials proposed to split the central body responsible for military imports into
smaller cells in each of Trade’s numerous foreign trade directorates. Though the
motives for this are not entirely clear, it seems to have been intended to boost
Trade’s autonomy with respect to the Red Army by fragmenting any military
presence at the commissariat’s heart. The new, smaller cells would be further
from the commissariat’s center of gravity and less powerful.
The Red Army certainly interpreted Trade’s proposal as an attack. According
to Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht, deputy chair of the Military-Revolutionary
Council, the proposal would reduce the military’s authority. Moreover, the reor-
ganization would seriously hamper military imports. Decentralizing military
work would demand more trained staff, and though Trade officials argued that
the military lost sight of the commercial side of its operations, Unshlikht coun-
tered that whenever trade bypassed military men who knew what equipment
ought to cost, huge cost overruns resulted.41
Importing military equipment, though important to Unshlikht and the Red
Army, was only part of the Trade Commissariat’s defense responsibilities. Trade
also controlled the stockpiles that would keep the Soviet war economy running
through the initial period of war. In addition to food and forage for the Red
Army, this meant raw materials for industry and food stores for cities. Trade’s
Mobilization and Defense Sector was charged with maintaining these stores
untouched, a difficult task when industrial managers desperately needed those
valuable and hard-to-find commodities amid the shortages of the First Five-Year
Plan.
In 1930, the People’s Commissariat of Trade revised its basic policy outlin-
ing its defense responsibilities, providing not only a sketch of the state of civil-
military links, but also illustrating the Red Army’s increasing influence. On 10
February 1930, Deputy Commissar of Trade Khinchuk circulated a draft to the
Red Army and other commissariats. In it, Vashkevich, director of Trade’s Mobi-
lization Section, described his responsibility as providing the Red Army during
mobilization with two months of food, fodder, and key raw materials from “mo-
bilization funds” (mobilizatsionnye fondy). These included “colonial products,”
i.e., tropical goods such as rubber not produced domestically. Trade would also
accumulate “special funds” to feed important population centers, and “defense
funds” to provide raw materials for industry. These were intended strictly for
factories supplying the Red Army; plants manufacturing civilian goods were ex-
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pected to accumulate their own stockpiles from internal resources. The Red
Army had the privilege of determining its own needs, which Trade would be
obliged to meet. Under the draft policy, the Red Army controlled the distribu-
tion of these stockpiles and determined its own level of mobilization support.42
By 15 August 1930, a revised list of responsibilities and table of organization
for Trade’s Mobilization-Defense Sector were ready. The sector was charged, first
and foremost, with carrying out defense measures throughout Trade at the
government’s behest. It would oversee defense preparations among Trade’s
branches, while readying contingency plans for mobilization and possible evacua-
tion, in addition to providing for the anti-aircraft defense of its warehouses and
stockpiles. Appointed to ensure a steady supply of goods to the Red Army, the
sector would also accumulate and manage stockpiles of raw materials in the event
of war.43
In addition, the sector would determine control figures (broad general
guidelines) for wartime internal trade and wartime supplies for the Soviet popu-
lation. It would develop both a five-year peacetime defense plan and yearly
budget estimates. Along with determining which functionaries should be
shielded from wartime conscription, it would protect vital trucks and automo-
biles from requisition. It would explore surrogates for scarce or imported raw
materials. It would manage questions of foreign trade, including the evacuation
of foreign workers from sensitive regions. It would manage relations with foreign
firms during wartime, and administer trade with “Eastern countries and other
neutral states” (a formulation which accepted the Red Army’s understanding that
its next war would be with its western border states). Finally, it would develop a
competent group of mobilization workers for Trade, audit and inspect Trade’s
defense preparations, and run drill mobilizations.44
At least on paper, the new Mobilization and Defense Sector was given the
necessary authority to force Trade’s other sections to devote scarce time, man-
power, and resources to preparations for a war that might not come. The Direc-
tor of the new sector ranked as a Deputy People’s Commissar and sat in the
commissariat’s collective collegium. The Director had the right to demand
information from any section of the commissariat, issue orders in his own name,
and exert jurisdiction over defense anywhere in Narkomtorg. In addition, the
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Director was given explicit power to implement all defense-related directives
from the government. The statute also set up the Mobilization and Defense
Sector’s organization, including a Planning-Organizational Group to handle
preparations for war, and a Group for Provisions to the Red Army to run
wartime military supply. The Reserves Group oversaw stockpiles and storage
facilities, while the Transport Section determined wartime requirements for
transportation.45
Although the need for stockpiles was absolutely clear, both to support the
armed forces during mobilization and to support industry during a cut-off of
imports, in the short term this presented industrial managers with a dilemma.
Given the frantic pace of Stalinist industrialization, Soviet industry faced chronic
shortages of imported and domestic materials. The natural result was that Soviet
managers would regularly “borrow” (pozaimstvovat′) scarce materials from mobi-
lization stockpiles. Central authorities, particularly the STO and its subcommit-
tees, tried to regulate this by permitting only some requests and demanding
immediate replenishment of mobilization stocks. Informal and unauthorized
borrowing from mobilization stockpiles, while of course illegal, could only have
been encouraged by governmental approval of massive levels of borrowing.
Soviet archival records are replete with the borrowing of raw materials from
mobilization funds or “special reserve funds.” Some central organization, typi-
cally but not always the RZ STO, would permit an economic agent – Vesenkha,
an industrial trust, or an individual factory – to remove a specified quantity of
material from mobilization stocks to be repaid by a fixed date: the 600 tons of
rubber used on 16 April 1929 in the chart below had to be replenished by 1
June. In some instances, as in the 700 tons of rubber removed from mobilization
stocks at the end of 1930, permission came directly from the Politburo. The
Politburo in its 15 July 1929 defense decision had decided to “categorically for-
bid the expenditure of defense mobilization stockpiles for civil purposes, and also
temporary borrowing from stockpiles,”46 to little avail:
Table 1. Partial List of Materials Taken from Defense Stockpiles
18 September 1928 2,950 tons of copper
430 tons of tin
1,300 tons of lead
495 tons of aluminum
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750 tons of refined zinc
65 tons of nickel
24 November 1928 200 tons of saltpeter
30 December 1928 200 tons of copper
150 tons of zinc
12 February 1929 850 tons of saltpeter
15 March 1929 1,100 tons of copper
16 April 1929 600 tons of rubber
22 April 1929 2,000 tons of lead
2 July 1929 2,500 tons of tanning chemicals
4 August 1930 1,000 tons of rubber
17 August 1930 150 tons of copper
21 August 1930 1,000 tons of baling wire
22 September 1930 20 tons of ferro-tungsten alloys
1 October 1930 84 tons of zinc
65 tons of aluminum
21 October 1930 3,000 tons of saltpeter
14 December 1930 50 tons of ferro-chromium alloys
15 tons of ferro-tungsten alloys
3 tons of ferro-vanadium alloys
20 tons of nickel
25 December 1930 700 tons of rubber
18 August 1931 2,000 tons of non-ferrous metals
8 January 1932 48 tons of nickel
Certainly not exhaustive, this list illustrates the scale of dipping into mobilization
stocks. It also suggests an interesting pattern. Clusters of borrowing appear before
the end of the 1927–28 fiscal year (30 September), the 1929–30 fiscal year (30
September), and the October-December 1930 “Special Quarter” marking the
transition to a fiscal year coinciding with the calendar year and having its own
intense production targets. Borrowing appears to have been a standard tool of
last-minute storming to meet difficult production targets.
The People’s Commissariat of Finance had less well-attested military institu-
tions, at least judging by Red Army records. As early as March 1928, People’s
Commissar of Finance Nikolai Petrovich Briukhanov reported to the RZ STO
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that a Mobilization Section (otdel) was being developed in Finance.47 Nearly two
years later, on 30 January 1930, the RZ STO went further and ordered Finance
to form a Defense Directorate (Upravlenie oborony). This did not mark the crea-
tion of a wholly new body responsible for military issues, rather the systematiza-
tion of existing, uncoordinated efforts. In addition to absorbing the war prepara-
tion functions of the Mobilization Section, the new Defense Directorate would
finance the Red Army’s expenditures, defense-related outlays of civil people’s
commissariats, and capital construction associated with mobilization. Besides the
old Mobilization Section, the Defense Directorate took over the Military-Naval
Section (otdel) of the Budget Directorate and the military functions of the Ad-
ministration for Financing the National Economy. All other branches of Finance
apart from the new Defense Directorate would have a liaison, a “special consult-
ant for mobilization questions,” attached to handle defense policy.48
The People’s Commissariat of Labor of the Russian Republic also had de-
fense responsibilities, duties which it carried out unsatisfactorily. In January 1930
the defense subgroup of the Russian Republic’s Council of People’s Commissars
urged increased training in specific skills useful for military production in the
civil education programs located near concentrations of military industry. At the
same time, it found there was no plan for dealing with labor in the collectivized
sector of Russian agriculture: the Red Army, in war as in peace, would be
dominated by peasant conscripts and create a manpower crunch in the country-
side. The fault did not lie entirely with the Labor Commissariat. Its parent all-
union Commissariat of Labor had been weak in displaying leadership over de-
fense questions. Vesenkha was also remiss in aiding the Russian Labor Commis-
sariat, declaring its needs without providing plans for covering them.49
But what do all these efforts ultimately mean? The foregoing litany of end-
less organizational chaos, mind-numbing shuffling of titles and offices, unceasing
Red Army complaints at civilians’ inability to prepare for war, and continual ex-
hortations from above to improve defense planning may leave the reader at a loss
as to the final significance of the Red Army’s struggle to improve preparedness.
When looked at as a whole, however, these bureaucratic measures do display a
marked trend. Throughout the late 1920s, defense cells inside Soviet civil ad-
ministration grew steadily in their number, scope, and expertise. Disorder, chaos,
incompetence, and vacillations do not detract from what the Red Army slowly
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and painfully achieved: a growing ability to compel and foster the comprehensive
organization of the Soviet state for war. In this sense, the Red Army’s quest was
much like the better-known Stalinist revolutions of collectivization and industri-
alization. In both cases, a detailed picture reveals a staggering level of misman-
agement, incompetence, and active and passive resistance; in Merle Fainsod’s
words, “a totalitarian facade concealed a host of inner contradictions.”50 Never-
theless, the Soviet peasantry was collectivized, and the Soviet economy was in-
dustrialized. In the same way, the obstacles to preparing Soviet society for war
did not halt the preparation of Soviet society for war.
Of the obstacles the Red Army faced in preparing the Soviet Union for the
next war, institutional inertia and passive resistance by managers with better ways
to spend their time and resources could be and finally were overcome by the
wholehearted support of the highest levels of party and state authority. Lack of
trained and qualified personnel to man defense cells was an equally serious prob-
lem, but one the Red Army could solve itself. While military officers could assist
civil institutions, the Red Army was itself desperately short of competent com-
manders.51 To meet the growing need for knowledgeable mobilization planners,
in early 1929 the Red Army itself began training bureaucrats in the skills needed
to prepare the Soviet Union for war. In special schools, the Red Army Staff
taught hundreds of mid-career mobilization workers from all branches of the
Soviet state how to think about and plan for war the Soviet way.
The idea for a special school for mobilization planning did not come from
the military, but instead from Briukhanov, People’s Commissar of Finance, who
showed a great deal of sympathy for the Red Army’s needs. In June 1928 he
wrote to Voroshilov to report that a Finance investigation had unearthed a whole
series of disasters in mobilization planning. Most importantly, Finance’s defense
personnel lacked any concept of the greater scheme of economic mobilization in
which they participated. Briukhanov suggested that the Red Army create a short
course in economic mobilization, and stressed the importance of the military’s
running the program, not civil commissariats. Voroshilov relayed Briukhanov’s
suggestion to the Staff for further development.52 The Red Army’s training pro-
gram would ultimately retain the features proposed by Briukhanov: Staff control
and broad exposure to all sorts of mobilization work.
Preparations consumed six months, but by December 1928 the Staff’s N. A.
Efimov announced the formation of a Military-Economic Division under
KUVNAS (Finishing Courses for the High Command) within the Frunze Mili-
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tary Academy, and solicited students for the school. The Military-Economic Di-
vision would run a three-month course at Red Army expense beginning in Feb-
ruary 1929 for special training of mobilization workers. The initial aim was to
include 30 students from the Red Army and 70 from civil institutions.53 After
delays, Voroshilov approved a three-month course beginning no later than 1
April 1929 and including 70 students, ten from the Red Army. The RZ STO
ordered civil institutions to cooperate fully.54
Response to the Red Army’s initiative was quick. Some were puzzled by the
concept and requested more information.55 Others demanded the lion’s share of
the instructional time and a say in running the program, with the People’s
Commissar of Transportation most insistent on running and staffing the course
himself. Transportation’s mobilization director suggested that 125 of 298 hours
of instruction be devoted to railroads, and requested 12 slots for his own person-
nel.56 After the end of the first session, Zvonarev of Post and Telegraph would
similarly complain about his specialty’s short shrift: a mere four hours of semi-
nars.57 Red Army Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov, overseeing the school, duti-
fully ignored most of these petitions except for, significantly, suggestions from
Ernest Fritsevich Appoga, powerful secretary of the RZ STO.58
Most institutions were eager to dispatch students, generally asking for more
places for their personnel in the current session or a promise of future slots. The
candidates themselves likely looked forward to three expense-paid months in
Moscow. Some organizations were irked by the three-month forced loss of a
senior employee, still owed a regular salary and a guaranteed return to previous
employment. Those who felt their time too important for the course were rudely
corrected. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Postnikov, coordinating mobilization for
Vesenkha, complained that with his Five-Year Plan and budgetary control figures
for the next year to complete, he could not possibly spare people for the first ses-
sion. Voroshilov, without sympathy, brooked no excuses.59
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The makeup of the student body was the subject of endless wranglings over
the exact distribution of slots. The early students were as a group quite similar to
the elite of Soviet society, of which they were a small sample. While the records
on individual students are sketchy, the Staff did study the overall make-up of its
student body. Like the Red Army officer corps, or the higher-level bureaucrats of
the people’s commissariats, the students were mostly but not all Russian, and
mostly but not all Communists. In the first group, 63 of 73 of the students were
party members, with no distinction made among youth, candidate, and full
members. The institution with the lowest percentage of party membership
among its students was the Red Army (four of eight).60 Little attention was paid
to class origin. Despite the focus on security (as discussed below), all these stu-
dents were senior mobilization workers and so, as Shaposhnikov explained to
Voroshilov, had already been thoroughly vetted by the OGPU. The politically
unreliable were unlikely to make it into the course.61 Twenty of the students in
the initial class came from central government bodies, 55 from the union repub-
lics. The People’s Commissariats of Transportation and of Military and Naval
Affairs were most heavily represented with eight students each, followed by seven
each for Trade and for Post and Telegraph.62
Once preparations had been underway for four months, and two months af-
ter the original start date, the Red Army’s High Command formally recognized a
new Military-Economic Division under KUVNAS on 4 April 1929. The course
itself was organized around general lectures for all students, together with more
focused laboratories and seminars on particular subjects more closely related to
individual specialties. Finance, for example, took up four hours of lecture time,
but financial specialists would receive 80 hours of “theoretical-historical” training
and an additional 50 hours applying that to the USSR.63
Lack of qualified faculty limited the number of seminars, but the program
spared no effort in drawing lecturers, stressing administrators over academics. As
the start date grew closer, Shaposhnikov invited many of the leading lights of the
Soviet military to serve as lecturers. While he himself would participate, he also
extended invitations to, among others, Ian Ianovich Alksnis, later head of the
Red Air Force; Elizaveta Leonidovna Khmel′nitskaia, the interwar Soviet Union’s
only woman military theorist; Konstantin Mekhonoshin, chair of Gosplan’s De-
fense Sector; and Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilin, noted economist.64
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The school’s leadership was obsessed with security of the information pre-
sented. While much of the course material was from open sources, and many
lecturers had published books or articles similar to their lectures, strict precau-
tions were still taken. KUVNAS asked the Staff for special lockers for the stu-
dents’ course materials and texts, since they could not be taken safely back to the
students’ hotels.65 Extraordinary precautions were taken not only with physical
security of the texts, but with the information they contained. Although the stu-
dents involved were all mobilization workers involved in highly secret activities,
the lectures were kept as much as possible to open topics and data. As Shaposh-
nikov explained to Voroshilov, “for the sake of caution, all questions of readiness
are illuminated in general terms without indicating actual factors, real figures, or
our special measures characterizing our achievements in this area.” The lecturers
themselves, already vetted by the OGPU before taking up their own mobilization
work, were investigated again, and Shaposhnikov personally checked their
presentations. All lecture notes taken by the students were kept in a safe.66
Even before the end of the first session, results seemed so promising that
plans were already underway for a second.67 There was some rethinking based on
evaluations of the first run of the course. In particular, several observers com-
mented on excessive reliance on lectures and an insufficient number of seminars,
given a lack of qualified leaders.68 Projected schedules cut seminar hours sub-
stantially, due in all likelihood to continuing lack of instructors, by boosting lec-
ture hours at the expense of general and specialized seminars.69
KUVNAS was not the only educational venue for preparing the militariza-
tion of the Soviet economy. The Red Army and Vesenkha alike subsequently
opened other schools to meet the burgeoning need for mobilization workers. On
28 January 1930, Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, chair of Vesenkha, ordered
the creation of a section to study the economics of war in the Institute of Indus-
trial-Economic Research under the leadership of N. I. Vagranskii. To continue
and expand on KUVNAS’s mission, the RZ STO ordered the Red Army to cre-
ate a military-economic department within the Frunze Academy. Part of this de-
partment’s mission was explicitly to train civil bureaucrats and industrial manag-
ers in economic mobilization. At the end of November 1931, the Soviet gov-
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ernment established a department of military economics in the All-Union Plan-
ning Academy.70
Did these bureaucrats end their training convinced of the need to put a high
priority on military goals? It is impossible to say with certainty, and to a large
degree the question is simply irrelevant. Red Army planners fulminated as much
about civil and industrial managers’ inability to carry out their duties effectively
as they did about active resistance to military initiatives. Certainly, many cases of
incompetence concealed passive resistance to Red Army demands, but many
were what they seemed: the chaos that inevitably resulted from rapid industrial
expansion with a woefully undereducated population. Training civil administra-
tors in the mechanics of mobilization at least made them more capable of carry-
ing out orders from above, orders that increasingly put defense at the forefront of
economic policy and made defense concerns the chief priority of the Soviet state.
It is no shock to find Soviet policymakers constrained by an undereducated
population; the Red Army was hardly alone in scrambling to educate those with
whom it worked.71 What is different here is the effect this remedy had. The Red
Army’s school for mobilization created a cadre to implement in practice what
military and civil leadership agreed was theoretically necessary: the comprehen-
sive organization of society for war. Mark von Hagen has used the term “milita-
rized socialism” to refer to the Soviet Union’s brand of militarization, tying
comprehensive military goals and priorities to a socialist state.72 The Red Army’s
efforts, undertaken with the enthusiastic backing of Stalin’s regime, established
an infrastructure for wartime that grew steadily in scope and power. Despite the
concrete difficulties of creating that infrastructure, the Soviet Union found itself
far ahead of its capitalist rivals in militarizing its state and society.
Put in comparative context, the Red Army’s achievements in organizing so-
ciety for war are even more striking. As stressed above, the lessons of World War
I were clear to military planners around the world. Nonetheless, relative geo-
graphic isolation gave the United States and the United Kingdom the apparent
freedom to slash defense budgets and neglect military preparedness. Germany, by
contrast, had been forcibly disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles. Barred from
developing a substantial military in peacetime, the German military’s leadership
had no alternative but to create the infrastructure for rapid expansion in the
event of war – institutions similar in many ways to their Soviet counterparts, al-
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though the Soviets would build both a massive military force and means to ex-
pand it further. Barred from expending resources on a large standing army,
Germany instead focused on mechanisms for expansion.73 France is left as the
best comparative case, as a continental power anticipating a continental war.
There was, however, a deep divide between the French military’s sense of how
the next war ought to be fought and the willingness of French society to accept
the necessary measures. While the French military planned to win the next war
through a slow, methodical struggle of attrition, French legislators repeatedly
refused to authorize the manpower policies and peacetime organizational meas-
ures necessary to create and manage a society capable of that sort of war.74
The French comparison highlights the features that make Soviet militarized
socialism so striking. In France, it was the Left, fearing militarism, which proved
the greatest obstacle to the organization of French society for war. Ironically, in
the Soviet Union, the ne plus ultra of leftism, the party, state, and army saw no
contradiction between a socialist society and all-encompassing organization for
war. In France, the military leadership kept itself aloof from civilian government,
and failed to lobby successfully for the policies it thought desperately needed; in
the Soviet Union, military and civil leadership were closely intertwined and pos-
sessed a common understanding of their shared interests. This consensus lies at
the heart of militarized socialism. The Soviet party and state leadership had
fought a bitter civil war to stay in power, and many had seen front-line combat.
The Red Army’s high command included some newly-minted officers whose
Marxist backgrounds led them to embrace a conception of war that saw it as in-
timately tied to economy and society. Imperial officers had experienced first-
hand how economic and social collapse had doomed Russia in World War I. All
– party, state, and military elites alike – saw a centrally planned economy and
comprehensively organized society as the keys to victory in the war they felt cer-
tain would come.
Finally, this organization for war may have had its final payoff in 1941.
While thorough archival research has not yet been done on the Soviet response
to invasion and subsequent evacuation, it is certainly noteworthy that the Soviet
state was able to absorb the loss of so great a proportion of its territory, popula-
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tion, infrastructure, industry, and resources, and still function effectively.75 By
comparison with France’s utter collapse in 1940, or even Nazi Germany’s recur-
ring difficulties in efficiently mobilizing all its economic resources for the war
effort, the Soviet Union’s ability to endure such a loss is especially striking.
While there are certainly many reasons for such resilience, it seems likely that
prewar efforts to organize all branches of the state for war played a major part.
To that degree, the Soviet Union learned and profited from the disastrous war-
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